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This thesis examines the welfare and unemployment effects of public 
inputs for a small open economy, with a tariff or quota restriction. The 
production of public inputs is financed by foreign capital tax, income tax or 
consumption tax. Apart from the standard assumption in the trade literature 
that revenue from trade taxes is solely redistributed to consumers, we consider 
productive public expenditure and investment by assuming that government 
appropriates a certain portion of tax revenue for the public input production. 
Under the tariff regime, we show that an increase in public inputs 
always raises the unemployment rate, while in the quota case it depends on the 
magnitude o f the price elasticities of public inputs and the output elasticities. 
The optimal level of public inputs when unemployment exists is smaller than 
that under full employment in tariff case. There is a chance, however, for the 
opposite result in quota case. In addition, the rankings of the optimal levels of 
public input provision from foreign-capital-tax financing, income tax financing 
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1 Introduction 
The provision of public inputs by the government for certain industries 
of the economy can help them to grow at faster rates, especially in develop-
ing countries. As in the literature, the way to finance the public inputs is 
usually through distortionary or non-distortionary taxation. For examples, 
Samuelson (1954) employs lump-sum taxation to finance the public good 
and suggests the optimality rule for public expenditure under his frame-
work. Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2001) investigate the problem of public 
input provision of the less developed countries, in which the public input is 
financed by income tax and excise tax. Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and 
Atkinson and Stern (1974) derive the optimal supply of public goods that 
are financed by commodity and factor taxations. Among all these results, it 
is suggested that if the provision of public inputs is financed by distortionary 
taxation (e.g. consumption taxation), such policy would benefit certain in-
dustries in the sense that the public inputs have positive spillover effects 
on these industries' production levels. The remaining sectors, on the other 
hand, would be suffered as part of their potential income is being taxed and 
switched into that public input production. 
Many studies have suggested that the public input provision would af-
fect the trade pattern. Most of them argue that the public good may act as 
inputs into production processes rather than as consumption good only. For 
instance, Tawada and Okamoto (1983) examine the validity of four familiar 
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trade theorems when a public intermediate good is accommodated in the 
2x2 general equilibrium trade model. Manning, Markusen and McMillan 
(1985) extend the Lindahl pricing to public intermediate goods and suggest 
its alternatives. The welfare implications of different financing methods for 
the public input provision, and the role of public inputs as a trade deter-
minant, however, have not been discussed so much in these literatures till 
the last decade. Abe (1990) closes the above gap by laying a basic model 
for the analysis. In his model, public input is financed by income taxation 
with a rate that may not be optimal. He captures the notion of the spillover 
effects of public inputs by separable production functions of the private sec-
tor. Most importantly, he highlights the effect of differences in the provision 
of public inputs on trade patterns between countries. The financing con-
straints for the public good, however, has not been put into the model for 
welfare analysis as an alternative way to generate distortions. To extend 
the analysis in this direction, Feehan (1992) directly links the tariff revenue 
with the provision of public inputs and it is shown that this assumption can 
introduce a market failure into his model. Within this framework, Feehan 
(1992) argues that public sector production of the public inputs can lead 
to efficiency gains over private sector production under certain conditions. 
In short, Abe (1990) and Feehan (1992) shed lights on the deterministic 
role of public inputs on trade and emphasis on the importance of financing 
constraints for the public inputs. The problem of imperfect capital mobility 
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between countries (especially for the less developed countries), however, has 
been neglected in their studies, as suggested by Michael (1995). 
To cope with such problem, Michael (1995) takes into account of the 
financing constraint in the examination of the effect of foreign capital inflows 
to LDCs with the public input production. Tariff and foreign capital tax are 
imposed to finance the public inputs. Within the 2 x 2 model with public 
inputs and by the assumption of imperfect capital mobility, it is found that 
under a tariff, the inflow of foreign capital may increase the country's welfare, 
even if the imported good is capital intensive. In the presence of foreign 
capital taxes, however, foreign capital inflows would reduce the country's 
welfare. 
During the Asian financial crisis and the global economic downturns in 
the late 1990's, many governments try to relief the great pressure of increas-
ing unemployment by creating job opportunities. Providing public inputs 
is indeed a method they try to rely on. A problem arises here: Does the 
increase in public input necessarily reduce unemployment? To answer this 
question, Hazari and Sgro (1991) extend the analysis of Harris and Todaro 
(1970) by including non-traded goods in the model to analyze the structural 
adjustment in rural and urban areas. Chao and Yu (2001) consider the gov-
ernment's financing constraint for public input in a Harris-Todaro model, 
in which unemployment is allowed. The public input activities are financed 
by the revenue generated from quotas, and they suggest that raising public 
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inputs may help to reduce the level of unemployment. Welfare implications 
and the interpretation of optimal level are also suggested in their paper. 
The situation under tariff case and other possible distortions in the model, 
however, still have less being discussed. 
The purpose of this thesis is to further verify and to examine the wel-
fare effect caused by the public input activities under different financing 
schemes. These include foreign capital taxation, income taxation and con-
sumption taxation, incorporating either one of the two familiar trade restric-
tions, namely tariffs and quotas. Rural-urban migration induced by wage 
differential is also considered in the model by applying the Harris-Todaro 
model. 1 Apart from the standard assumption in the trade literature that 
revenue from trade taxes is solely redistributed to consumers in the form 
of lump-sum transfers, we consider productive public expenditure and in-
vestment by assuming that government will appropriate a certain portion of 
revenue from trade taxes for the public input production. By imposing sta-
bility conditions, our analysis agrees with Chao and Yu (2001) in quota case 
but against them in tariff case. The welfare impacts by different financing 
schemes are compared, and the ranking of the consequent optimal levels of 
public inputs implied from different financing sources will be discussed. 
Some comparative static exercises for the ba^ic model are presented after 
this introductory section. The welfare analysis of public inputs financed by 
^See Harris and Todaro (1970) for the detail arguments of the settings. 
4 
different combinations of above tax regimes is discussed in the next two 
chapters. Some concluding remarks are given in the final section of the 
thesis. 
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2 Literature Review 
This section consists of three parts: the first part looks into the interac-
tions of public goods and taxation while the second part reviews the notion 
on treating public goods as intermediate goods, which facilitate the produc-
tion of certain final consumption goods. The last part addresses the issues 
on capturing the phenomenon of wage differentials and unemployment into 
economic models. 
2.1 Public Goods and Taxation 
Samuelson (1954) states the nature of public goods clearly: "a collec-
tive consumption goods which all enjoy in common in the sense that each 
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any 
other individual's consumption of that good" (Samuelson, 1954). In his pa-
per, production possibility schedule relating totals of all outputs is assumed 
to be convex and smooth. An optimality rule for public expenditure is sug-
gested: In a first-best environment where (i) the provision of public goods is 
financed through non-distortionary taxation, and (ii) the private marginal 
cost and the social marginal cost of public good are equal, the sum across 
households of the marginal benefits of the unit must equal to the cost of 
the resources used up in providing it. The later one is also called the direct 
marginal cost (marginal rate of transformation) of the public goods. This is 
well known in the public finance literature as the "Conventional Rule" • 
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The assumption of using non-distortionary taxation to finance the public 
good provision is soon be challenged by the fact that many countries use dis-
tortionary (e.g. commodity) taxes extensively to finance their provision of 
public goods. Pigou (1947) argues that when the provision of public goods 
is financed through distortionary taxes, the marginal cost of the public good 
unambiguously understates its true social marginal cost because of the in-
duced indirect cost due to raising revenue through distortionary taxation. 
The loopholes of the argument, however, are revealed by the upcoming stud-
ies. Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995), in short, point out that Pigou has 
overlooked two factors: (i) the effect of the increased public good provision 
on tax revenue due to the relationship between private taxed commodity and 
public goods in consumption; and (ii) the decrease in tax revenue when the 
distortionary tax is imposed on a Giffen good or on a factor of production 
with a backward bending supply curve. 
Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) distinguish three classes of taxes corre-
sponding to the three necessary conditions for pareto optimality: (i) Taxing 
different commodities and factors at different rates introduces a distortion 
between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transfor-
mation. (ii) Differential factor taxes make the marginal rates of substitution 
of different factors in different industries different, and hence interfere with 
productive efficiency, (iii) Differential tax treatment of individuals makes 
the marginal rate of substitution of various commodities different among 
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individuals and hence results in “ exchange inefficiency". They derive the 
optimal tax formula and clarify the stance on the relationship between the 
shadow prices to be used in the public sector and certain market prices. To 
quote, 
"(i). If the only constraint on the government is the imposi-
tion of lump sum taxes, then the shadow prices to be used in the 
public sector are equal to the marginal rates of transformation 
in the private sector. 
(ii). If a constraint is imposed on the taxation of some fac-
tors (commodities) in the private sector, the shadow prices to 
be used in the public sector are equal to the marginal rates of 
transformation in the fully tajced sectors. 
(iii). If, say, a tax cannot be imposed on Li and L2 in any 
sector of the economy,2 then the marginal rate of substitution in 
the private sector will equal the marginal rate of transformation; 
nonetheless, the government in the public sector should not use 
this marginal rate as its shadow price. 
(iv). If there is an overall budget constraint on the govern-
ment, but no other constraint on the fiscal powers of the gov-
ernment then the shadow price in the government sector is a 
weighted average of the marginal rate of substitution and the 
2See Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) for the notations. 
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marginal rate of transformation. 
(V). When other constraints are imposed on the taxation 
powers of the government, e.g. the government cannot impose 
100 percent profits tax, the shadow price in the government sec-
tor need not lie between the marginal rate of substitution and the 
marginal rate of transformation in the private sector." [Stiglitz 
and Dasgupta (1971), pl73] 
Apart from the "Samuelsonian" that the optimum level of public goods 
is achieved as a competitive equilibrium with the government supplying 
the public goods up to the point where the sum of MRS equal to MRT 
and financing its production by lump-sum taxation, Atkinson and Stern 
(1974) exclude lump-sum taxation and modify the optimization problem to 
include explicitly the means by which government revenue is raised. In their 
analysis, two distortionary taxes, ad valorem commodity and factor taxes, 
are employed. Their conclusion support the criticism made by Stiglitz and 
Dasgupta on Pigou in the sense that the Conventional Rule as defined above 
may be an over- or under-estimate of the incremental benefits of a public 
good. The correct benefit measure with distortionary taxation may exceed 
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution: (a) where the public good 
is complementary with taxed private goods, (b) where a rise in exogenous 
income would lead to a fall in the net tax paid. 
The study of production of public goods financed by distortionary taxes 
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continues for the next two decades. Wildasin (1984) reconsiders the prob-
lem of public expenditure evaluation with distortionary taxation. A general 
equilibrium model is developed, with identical households and distortionary-
tax-financed public expenditure. Conditions under which a marginal change 
in public expenditure (starting from an arbitrary initial level) increases or 
decreases welfare are also analyzed. The main contribution of Wildasin 
(1984) is that he emphasizes the crucial importance of interactions between 
the level of public good provision and the demand for (supply of) taxed com-
modities. He points out that the welfare evaluation of public expenditure 
should take into account the effect of incremental public good provision on 
the demand of taxed good. Logically, there is no doubt that either the ordi-
nary or compensated demand (or both) for every private good, including in 
particular every taxed good, must change as the level of public expenditure 
changes. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the adjustment to the 
welfare criterion necessitated by this effect will be quantitatively insignifi-
cant.^ 
While Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Atkinson and Stern (1974) and 
Wildasin (1984) reach their conclusions that in certain cases, Pigou's ar-
gument breaks down since the marginal cost of public good may actually 
overstate its true social marginal cost, Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995) 
relax their assumption that when, for instance, a commodity tax is imposed, 
3See Wildasin (1984), section IV. 
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producer prices remain unchanged, thus the relationship between the private 
and social marginal costs of the public good depends only on the relationship 
between the taxed factor or private good and the public good in consump-
tion. They assume that a consumption tax will alter the relative prices of 
the flexible price non-traded goods. The economy is small and open, and 
the provision of the public good is financed through consumption taxes on 
traded or non-traded goods. Under this framework they show that if the 
private taxed and the public goods are general equilibrium complements in 
consumption, then the marginal cost of the public good may overstate its 
social marginal cost. In other words, partial equilibrium complementarily 
between the taxed private and the public good is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for the possibility of the marginal cost of the public good 
to overstate its true social marginal cost. When goods with flexible prices 
exist, the relationship between the private and social marginal cost of the 
public good depends, in addition to the complementarity/substitutability in 
consumption between private taxed and public goods, on the complemen-
tarity /substitutability between (i) the public and non-traded goods, and (ii) 
the non-traded and taxed goods. They also show that when the marginal 
cost of the public good overstates its true social marginal cost, the second-
best rule which is the first-order condition, gives a consumption tax that 
may minimize not maximize welfare. If the first-order condition gives a con-
sumption tax that minimizes welfare, then the optimal policy calls for a zero 
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consumption tax, and no provision of the public good. 
Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2001) revisit the problem of public goods 
provision with a practical concern of unemployment in Harris-Todaro para-
digm. It will be discuss in detail in section 2.3. 
2.2 Public Goods as Intermediate Goods 
For decades, the analysis of international trade theory with respect to 
intermediate goods is a main extension. Much attention, however, has been 
focused only on private intermediate goods. Driven from appealing fact 
that the role of government becomes more and more important, Tawada 
and Okamoto (1983) consider trade analysis with respect to the public in-
termediate goods within the general equilibrium framework. By confining 
their interest to a special type of the public goods, they avoid the problem 
of variable returns to scale that caused by the introduction of public in-
puts. The validity of four traditional trade theorems is examined. These in-
clude the Stolper-Samuelson, Samuelson-Rybczynski, Heckscher-Ohlin and 
factor-price equalization theorems. The public good is assumed to be of 
a semi-public kind.'^  All in all, they present the circumstances where the 
positive results for all of the above theorems, except the factor-price equal-
ization theorem, hold. For factor-price equalization, they show that th'ere is 
a tendency for trade to equalize prices. 
-^See also Meade (1952) 
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Manning, Markusen and McMillan (1985) also notice the important role 
of public good that acts as inputs into production processes rather than as 
consumption goods. They suggest that Lindahl pricing can be extended to 
public intermediate goods, by requiring that firms pay in proportion to the 
marginal contribution of these goods to profit. As an alternative to Lindahl 
pricing, the public inputs provision is financed by an across-the-board tax on 
factor incomes at a rate that depends on production parameters. Though it 
is frequently argued that efficiency requires that public services be financed 
by direct charges on their users, Manning, Markusen and McMillan (1985) 
conclude that it is sometimes impossible to apply user charges. Instead, they 
suggest a procedure that works even whether or not user charges are feasible. 
Furthermore, it is shown that the proportional tax system is administratively 
much more straightforward than Lindahl pricing. Also, they point out that 
an ad valorem sales tax, imposed on sales of the private good at the same 
rate as the efficient income tax, is equally good. 
The differences in the technology or the factor endowments have long 
been emphasized as the causes of trade among others. However, the pro-
vision of public inputs may affect the competitiveness of some industries 
and this impact when we consider what determines trade patterns between 
countries should also be considered. Abe (1990) is one of the literatures 
dealing with such an issue. He notices the importance of how control of the 
production of public inputs affects trade patterns and clarifies the determi-
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nants of trade in the public input economy by using a decomposition of the 
comparative advantage due to the public inputs. While Manning, Markusen 
and McMillan (1985) attain the social optimum in the economy with pure 
public intermediate good by the optimal tax, Abe (1990) sets up a model 
in which the cost of production of public inputs is financed by the income 
tax with a rate which may not be optimal. Two propositions are suggested: 
(1) Given that (i) the two countries have identical preferences, technology 
and factor endowments; (ii) the spillover effects of the public inputs are the 
same between the private sectors, or they are sufficiently small; and (iii) the 
public sector is capita (labor) intensive relative to the private sectors, then 
the country that produces more public inputs exports the commodity of the 
industry that is relatively labor (capital) intensive in the private sectors and 
imports the other commodity. (2) Given that (i) the two countries have 
identical preferences, technology and factor endowments and (ii) the factor 
intensity of the public sector is the same as, or sufficiently close to, that of the 
private sectors, then the country that produces more public inputs exports 
the commodity of the industry that enjoys larger degree of the spillover of 
the public inputs and imports the other commodity. In his conclusion, three 
factors that determine the trade patterns between countries are concluded: 
(i) The direct effect on the relative cost and the indirect effects due to the 
change in the wage-rental ratio which is originated from the change in the 
factor demands of the private sector, (ii) the private sector itself and (iii) 
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the public sector. The above results are obtained upon the assumption of 
separable production functions of the private sector. If general production 
functions are employed, however, Abe (1990) claims that the effects listed 
above will also appear at least in the public input economy. 
Based on the fact that many less-developed-coiintries (LDCs) rely heav-
ily on tariffs as a revenue source to provide public inputs,^ Feehan (1992) 
extends the analysis by linking the tariff revenue directly to the provision of 
a public input, a produced input that collectively enters firms' production 
functions. This assumption introduces a market failure into his model. In 
his two traded goods, one non-traded good and two factors environment, the 
first-best result indicates that the quantity of the public inputs ought to be 
increased to the point where national income, evaluated at world prices, is 
maximized. An efficiency condition was derived for the provision of public 
inputs when they are produced by cost-minimizing firms. It is shown that 
how it differs from the first-best condition depends not only on the factor 
intensity ranking but also on the precise fashion by which the public inputs 
affect production functions for private goods. In addition, he argues that 
the public sector production of public inputs can lead to efficiency gains 
over private sector production. More specifically, it is found that ambiguity 
regarding the comparison with the first-best rule declines as more is known 
about the public inputs. 
®IMF (1996) confirms that more than sixty countries raise in excess of 16% of their tax 
revenues from export and import duties. 
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The analysis of Abe (1990) and Feehan (1992), pointed out by Michael 
(1995), has ignored the international capital mobility. To close this gap, 
Michael (1995) develops a general equilibrium trade model of a less devel-
oped country, facing imperfect international capital mobility. He examines 
the welfare effects of an inflow of foreign capital when the government fi-
nances the provision of the public input either (i) by the foreign capital tax 
revenue, or (ii) by tariff revenue from the imported goods. In a world with-
out public inputs or distortions, it is well known that an exogenous foreign 
capital inflow improves the country's welfare if it decreases its domestic rate 
of return, otherwise it remains unchanged. In the presence of tariff, however, 
an exogenous inflow of foreign capital reduces the country's welfare, if the 
imported good is capital intensive (Brecher and Diaz, 1977), or if the en-
dogenous capital is specific in the production of the imported good (Brecher 
and Findlay, 1983). Within his two-good, two-factor and one public input 
model, he suggests circumstances that in the presence of a tariff, the inflow 
of foreign capital may increase the country's welfare, even if the imported 
good is capital intensive. By the assumption of imperfect capital mobility, 
the domestic rate of return to capital is differs from its world rate of return. 
Along this line, an inflow of foreign capital does not affect welfare directly, 
but only indirectly through the change in the level of public input. Thus, he 
also suggests some conditions under which in the presence of capital taxes, 
the inflow of foreign capital may decrease the country's welfare. 
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Chao and Yu (2001) extend the analysis further by introducing unem-
ployment into their analysis. Despite using quota revenue as a source to 
finance the public input provision, they relax the assumption that revenue 
from trade taxes is completely redistributed to consumers in the form of 
lump-sum transfers. By using Harris-Todaro paradigm and similar setup 
with Abe (1990), Chao and Yu (2001) suggests that when the financing con-
straint of public inputs is taken into account, urban development through 
public investment may, however, reduces the welfare in of a dual economy 
with or without unemployment. The manufactured price ratio, nevertheless, 
always been lowered through this process. Chao and Yu (2001) claim that 
if the economy is a price setter in world trade, the decreased manufacturing 
price ratio amounts to an improvement in the terms of trade, which follows 
that urban development can reduce welfare even if the economy experiences 
improvement in terms of trade. Under their framework, the partial relation-
ships of rural wage level, urban unemployment rate, domestic rental rate, 
the production level of agricultural products and the production level of 
manufactured products with respect to the change in relative price or the 
level of public input are all consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson result. 
The optimal level of provision of public inputs which is implicitly defined in 
their analysis is also interpreted. 
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2.3 W a g e Differentials and Unemployment 
In a pioneering paper Harris and Todaro (1970) address on the accel-
erating labor migTation between rural and urban area. In their two-sector 
analysis, urban wage is assumed to be politically determined, at a level that 
is substantially higher than rural earnings. They suggest that the migration 
proceeds in response to urban-rural differences in "expected earnings". 
The main contributions of Harris and Todaro (1970) is that they demon-
strate the continued existence of rural-urban migration in spite of substantial 
overt urban-unemployment represents an economically rational choice on the 
part of the individual migrant. They also show economists' standard pol-
icy prescription of generating urban employment opportunities through the 
use of "shadow prices" implemented by means of wage subsidies or direct 
government hiring will not lead to a welfare improvement and may, in fact, 
exacerbate the problem of urban unemployment. In addition, they evalu-
ate the welfare implications of alternative policies associated with various 
back-to-the-land programs when it is recognized that the standard remedy 
suggested by economic theory, namely, full wage flexibility, is for all practical 
purpose politically infeasible. Attention is paid on the impact of migration 
cum unemployment on the welfare of the rural sector as a whole which gives 
rise to intersectoral compensation requirements. Last but not least, Harris 
and Todaro (1970) argue that in the absence of wage flexibility, an optimal 
policy is a "policy package" including both partial wage subsidies ( or direct 
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government employment) and measures to restrict free migration. 
Yu (1979) explore the implications of technical improvement for regional 
capital-labor ratios, factor rewards, and output production. He employs the 
two-region model that involves an investment good industry in the first re-
gion and a consumption good industry in the second region. The investment 
good is produced to serve as an input for the production of the consumption 
good, which is analogy to the nature of public inputs. The results are ob-
tained by conducting a comparative static analysis in a model incorporating 
stable wage differentials. Yu (1979) suggests that technical improvement 
in the region with investment good will result an increase (decrease) in the 
capital/labor ratios in both regions if this region is labor (capital) inten-
sive in the value sense. Besides, such technical progress will also result in a 
concomitant rise (decline) in the capital rentals coupled with decline (rise) 
in the wage rates in both regions if the region mentioned above is capital 
(labor) intensive in the value sense relative to the region with consumption 
goods. 
Extending the analysis of Harris and Todaro (1970)，Hazari and Sgro 
(1991) include non-traded goods in the model to analyze structural adjust-
ment in LDCs. They make assumption on the two regions in the economy 
that each region produces one non-traded good in additional to its conven-
tional production. Each region uses region-specific capital and completely 
mobile labor. All in all, Hazari and Sgro (1991) suggest four theorems that 
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provide insights regarding structural adjustment in rural and urban areas, 
urban unemployment and trade issues. It is suggested that structural adjust-
ment is concerned with the regional composition of output and the effect of 
deterioration in the terms of trade on factor rewards and commodity prices 
are determinate in the urban region. 
Two features of the studies mentioned in section 2.1 motivate the born 
of later papers. First, the efficiency rule for public good provision in all 
those studies are derived within the context of a small open or closed econ-
omy with full employment. Unemployment, however, is not much or less 
discussed. Second, they consider the case where a government uses a single 
policy instrument to finance the provision of the public good. In fact, how-
ever, governments may have at their disposal several tax instruments that 
they can simultaneously use in order to raise revenue for financing the provi-
sion of public goods. To block such loopholes, Michael and Hatzipanayotou 
(2001) deal with the problems by introducing Harris-Todaro paradigm into 
public input analysis. They assume that in order to finance the provision of 
public inputs, the government raises tax revenue through the imposition of 
separately an income tax, an excise tax on the manufactured good, or and 
import tariff. An import competing manufactured good and pure public 
consumption good are produced in the urban sector, while an export agri-
cultural good is produced in the rural sector. The minimum wage above 
the market clearing level in urban area is institutionally fixed, which results 
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in sectoral unemployment. The welfare effect of each policy regime is ex-
amined and the efficiency rule for public good provision in each case is also 
suggested. In short, Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2001) suggest that in 
the presence of unemployment when income tax or lump-sum tax revenue is 
used to finance the provision of the public good, the private marginal cost 
always overstates its social marginal cost. Moreover, when an excise tax on 
the manufactured good or a tariff is used, then the private marginal cost 
of public good provision may overstate its social marginal cost even if the 
taxed and public goods are substitutes. 
Chao and Yu (2001) also capture the unemployment problem into their 
dual economy analysis, with the financing constraint explicitly stated. They 
employ Harris-Todaro setup and assume that the government use quota 
revenue to finance the provision of public i n p u t s , 
®See Chapter 2, section 2.2, this thesis 
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3 The Basic Model and Effects of Public Inputs 
Following Chao and Yu (2001), we employ a dual economy framework 
based upon Harris and Todaro (1970), incorporating public inputs^ The 
economy produces two goods, namely X i , the agricultural good which takes 
place in rural areas, and X2, the manufactured good, which is produced in 
urban areas. Two primary factors, labor (L) and capital {K) are used in 
production with constant returns to scale technology; each factor exhibits 
positive but diminishing marginal productivity. Output of good X2 in the 
urban area depends upon the level of public inputs in addition to the use of 
the two factors. The production of good X i in the rural area is assumed to 
be unaffected by the public inputs. The production functions can then be 
expressed as 
二 F i ( L u K i ) (1) 
X2 = g(R)F2(L2,K2) (2) 
where Li and Ki denote respectively the sector's employment of labor 
and capital, i = 1,2. R is the level of public inputs (For instances, public 
health service, infrastructure, education, research and development, etc.), 
which is provided by the government.® Note that Fi represents the "kernal" 
7 For a simple interregional wage differential model, see Yu (1979) and Batra and Scully 
(1971). For recent studies on Harris-Todaro (1970) model, see Chao and Yu (1990, 1994), 
Hazari and Sgro (1991) and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2001). 
8 See Abe (1990) for a nice exposition on the modeling of public inputs. 
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production function with homogeneity of degree one in Li and Ki. The 
spillover effect of the public input on X2 is described by g, which is a pos-
itively monotonic function in R and strictly concave. Using the definition 
by Kenzo and Abe (1990), the impact of public inputs on good X2 can be 
captured by the following output elasticity: 
-RdC Rdg 
e = 万 矿 1 面 〉 0 � 
where C^ is the unit cost function of good i for i = 1, 2. 
It is commonly observed that equipment, skill and technology available in 
most developing countries characterized by a dual economy are not mature 
enough for carrying out public input production, we thus assume that the 
production of public inputs is carried out by utilizing mainly foreign capital 
such as skills and equipment.9 To simplify the analysis, the production 
function for the public input production is described as 
R 二叫3, in (4) 
where K* denotes foreign capital and L3 is the labor employed in urban area 
in order to produce the public inputs. We assume that the return to K* is 
r*, which is given exogenously. 
For simplicity, the input ratio for R is assumed to be fixed with one to one 
9See Chao and Yu (2001) and Michael(1995). 
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relationship with producing factors L and K. Thus, the public expenditure 
can be written as {w2 + r*)R, where W2 is the minimum wage paid to L2 
and L3 in urban sector, and W2 is institutionally fixed. 
Assuming that good Xi is exported, and good X2 is importable that 
faces trade restrictions. Taking the price of the agricultural products as 
numeraire, the domestic relative price of X2 can be expressed by p and its 
world price ratio by p*. 
Because of the wage differential between the two sectors, the rural-urban 
migration stops only when the wage paid in the rural area equals to the 
expected wage paid in the urban sector (Harris and Todaro, 1970). This 
condition can be regarded as the condition for the labor market equilibrium. 
As a result, we have 
W2 = wi{l-\- A) (5) 
where A = Lu/{L2 + L3) represents the urban unemployment ratio and 
1/(1 + A) stands for the probability of finding a job in the urban sector. L^ 
denotes the level of urban unemployment. 
Under the assumption of perfect competition, factors are paid at their 
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value marginal products: 
dXi ... 
犯2 = ⑴ 
, — 仏 — p ( 均 (8) 
where r denotes the rental rate to domestic capital in both sectors. 
The unit cost function for the agricultural product can be simply ex-
pressed as while the unit cost function for the manufactured good 
is assumed to be^ ® 
C\w2.r ,R) = C\w2.T) /g(R) (9) 
The cost functions are quasi-concave and homogenous of degree one in 
factor prices. The factor demands in sector i are Li = Cl^Xi and Ki = C^Xi 
by Shephard's Lemma, where the subscripts in the unit cost functions denote 
corresponding partial derivatives. 
Equations (10) and (11) state that the unit cost in each of the two sectors 
equals its output price in competitive equilibrium. Equations (12) and (13) 
denote the factor endowment constraints, and (14) is the demand for foreign 
� See Abe (1990) for a related discussion. 
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capital, 
CHwi,r) 二 1 (10) 
C\w2^r,R) = p (11) 
Cliwu r)X, + (1 + X)[Cliw2^ r, R)X2 + R] 二 L (12) 
Ci:{wi,r)Xi^C^(w2,r,R)X2 = K (13) 
K* = R (14) 
There are six equations, (5) and (10)-(14), and six endogenous variables, 
wi,r, A ,Xi ,X2 and K*, with a policy variable R and a parameter W2. To 
complete the production side of this dual economy, we introduce different 
financing constraints of the public input into the model. It will be done in 
later chapters, and some comparative exercises in the following will be done 
first. 
To see the effects of public inputs on the urban unemployment ratio, dif-
ferentiate (5) and (10) through (14). Consider the situation that the change 
in public inputs may affect the domestic price when the economy adopts the 
quota restriction on importable good (Chao and Yu, 2001). Without the 
loss the generality, we solve the systems as functions of policy parameter p 
and R to capture such partial effects. Thus 入 can be written in the function 
form 
X = (15) 
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As p can be solved as a function of R,入 can be rewritten asU 
\ = X(R,p(R)) (16) 
To sign d\/dR, differentiating (16) with respect to R yields: 
dX — dX dX dp . s 
The first term on the right hand side captures the direct effect of changes 
in public inputs on the unemployment rate, while the second term simply 
denotes the induced effect of changes in public inputs on the relative price 
of domestic goods. 
Using the "Hat Calculus" notation, let above the variable represent 
the percentage change. The results of exogenous changes in R and p on 
the endogenous variables are summarized, as follows (detail derivations are 
given in Appendix A.l)： 
^ i / p < 0 ； X/p> 0 ； r / p > 0 ； Xi/p< 0 ； X 2 / p > 0 (18) 
wjR < 0 ; V -S > 0 ； f / S > 0 ; Xi/R < 0 ； X2/R > 0 (19) 
The signs of all partial derivatives can be obtained by imposing the 
stability condition, which will be derived in Appendix A.3. Notice that the 
See Batra and Scully (1971) as an example of this decomposition method. 
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partial derivatives X i / p < 0 and X 2 I V � 0 exhibit normal output responses 
to good prices. The results in (18) and (19) are consistent with the Stopler-
Samuelson result by assuming that the agricultural sector is relatively labor 
intensive. An increase in p raises the urban rental rate, leading to a capital 
outflow from the rural to urban area. This capital outflow induces a rise in 
the rural marginal capital productivity according to diminishing marginal 
returns, thereby raising the rural rental rate. Labor demand is decreased 
because of the decline in marginal labor productivity, resulting a fall in wi. 
This explains the result o i w i / p < 0. The implication of the wage differential 
widening phenomenon is that, under this framework with the urban wage is 
institutionally fixed, a decrease in wi will be followed by an increase in the 
unemployment rate A. 
The consequences of the change in public inputs are similar to those of 
the domestic relative price ratio. An increase in R lowers the unit cost for 
the urban manufacturing good. At given W2 and the domestic good price 
ratio p, the rental rate r must rise to maintain zero profits. Hence, r / i ? > 0. 
The implications of other derivatives with respect to R can share the similar 
arguments as those for the partial derivatives with respect to p. 
The above results hold under the quota regime. However, if tariff is 
employed instead, p cannot adjust endogenously as it is determined by the 
world market equilibrium condition under the small open economy assump-
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tion, i.e. dp = 0 and hence the unemployment rate is a function of R only: 
A = X{R) (20) 
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4 Public Inputs, Financing Constraints and Na-
tional Welfare: The Tariff Case 
To complete the model for the welfare analysis, we have to consider the 
financing constraints mentioned before and the demand-side condition. The 
demand side information can be represented by an expenditure function 
E(p,u)=mm{Ci-\-pC2) (21) 
which minimizes the value of consumption of the two final commodities, Ci 
and C2, subject to a strictly quasi-concave utility function U{Ci, C2) < u. 
In this thesis, we introduce and compare three tax instruments under 
two trade restriction regimes. The tax instruments are widely employed 
by most of the governments as sources of revenue especially for the LDCs. 
The taxes considered are (i) foreign capital tax, (ii) income tax and (iii) 
consumption tax. 
Without the loss of generality, we assume that the domestic price is taken 
in the form of p == (p* + t)(l + e), where p is the domestic relative price of 
the manufactured good, t is the tariff rate, and e is a consumption tax rate 
which is levied widely on both agricultural and manufactured products. The 
revenue from foreign capital tax, income tax and consumption tax with tariff 
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is a source to finance the production of public inputs, as follows: 
{w2+r'')R = k{Tr*K*+p[Xi+pX2 + iw2+r*)R-r*K*] + e{Xi+pX2)-i-tM} 
(22) 
where k represents the proportion of tax revenue contributed to the produc-
tion of the public input. 丁 is the foreign capital tax rate and p is the income 
tax rate which is supposed to be levied on all returns to local residential 
production units. M is the domestic import for good 2. Under the assump-
tion of small open economy with tariff restriction, domestic price is fixed. 
In the following analysis, only one of the three taxes and tariff is included 
at one time. For instance, if the context is about tariff and foreign capital 
tax, then, in this case, the income tax rate p and the consumption tax rate 
e are set to zero. Based on the one to one relationship of the public input 
production with primary factors, we have 
{W2 + = /c[Tr*i? + p{Xi + pX2 + W2L3) + e{Xi + PX2) + tM] (23) 
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and thus, the economy's budget constraint, is represented by 
E(p,u) = (1 - p)(Xi + pX2 + W2L3) + (l-k) 
X [Tr*R + p(Xi + pX2 + W2L3) + e{Xi + pXi) + tM] (24) 
= ( 1 - kp){Xi -hpX2 + W2L3) 
+(1 - k)iTr*R + e{Xi + PX2) + tM) (25) 
where p* is fixed under the assumption of small open economy in which the 
domestic level of consumption of the manufactured good cannot affect the 
world price. 
Notice that if we define 7 二 fcp, 7 can be interpreted as an effective 
income tax rate. The first product on the right hand side of (25) is simply 
the income proceeds to the domestic production units after the deduction of 
effective income tax for the purpose of producing public inputs if such tax is 
in place. The second term is the tax revenue from tariff, and either foreign 
capital tax or consumption tax, redistribute to domestic consumers. 
Differentiating the financing constraint of (23) by imposing foreign cap-
ital tax, income tax and consumption tax separately with tariff yields (26), 
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(27) and (28) respectively: 
[w2-hr*{l-kT)]dR = Tr*Rdk + tMdk + tkdM (26) 
{W2 + r*)dR = + pX2 + W2Ls)dk + pk[dXi + pdX2 + W2dL3] 
+tMdk + ktdM (27) 
{W2+ r*)dR = tMdk + e[Xi + pX2)dk + ktdM 
+ e k i d X i + p d X 2 ) (28) 
We can now examine the impacts of public inputs on domestic imports 
of the manufactured good for the given tax regime and tariff. This process 
is done for the purpose of welfare analysis later. The level of tariff and the 
rate for another tax instrument are given. Total differentiating the budget 
constraint in (25), and setting dp = 0’ we get (29), (30) and (31) for the 
case of foreign capital tax, income tax and consumption tax respectively: 
Eudu 二 dXi + pdX2 + W2dL3 + - k)Tr*dR - Tr*Rdk 
- k)tdM - tMdk (29) 
Eudu = (1 - pk){dXi + p*dX2 + W2dL3) - p{Xi + pX2 + W2L3)dk 
+(1 - k)tdM + tMdk (30) 
Eudu = dXi 4- pdX2 + W2dL3 - e{Xi + pX2)dk - tMdk 
+(1 - k)tdM + e(l - k){dXi +pdX2) (31) 
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where Eu = dE/dU is the inverse of marginal utility of income and Eu > 0. 
To simplify the above equations, differentiating (1)，(2), (5)，（12) and yields 
the following result 
dXi + pdX2 + W2dL3 = vedR - wi(L2 + LsJdA (32) 
where v = PX2/R, denoting the value ratio of manufactured good to pub-
lic inputs and e represents the spillover effect of the public input R on 
X2. Substituting (26) to (28) into (29) to (31) respectively and replacing 
{dXi+pdX2+W2dL2) by [vedR-wi{L2-\-Lz)d\\, we get the following neat, 
simplified equations: 
Eudu = [ve -W2- r*(l - T)]dR - wi{L2 + L3)dX + tdM (33) 
Eudu 二 (ve - W2 - r*)dR - w八L2 + L3�dX + tdM (34) 
Eudu 二 {ye - W2 — r*)dR - W]XL2 + L^^dX + tdM 
+e{dXi +vdX2) (35) 
where equation (33) to (35) represent the cases of foreign capital tax, income 
tax and consumption tax respectively. 
In equations (26) and (28), we obtain dk/dR > 0 given 0 < k < I 
and 0 < r < 1. This implies an increase in the public input expenditure 
always raises the ratio for financing the provision of public inputs if the 
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economy uses tariff and either foreign capital tax or consumption tax as 
a source to finance the public inputs. On the other hand, a remarkable 
attention should be made on the sign of dk/dR derived in (27). Consider 
the following equation derived from equation (27) 
dk 一 (W2 + r*) - pkve 
Jr = p{Xi + pX2 + W2Lz) + tM 
that is, in the dual economy with public input provision financed by income 
tax and tariff revenue, if the marginal cost exceeds (below) the after-tax 
marginal benefits from producing each additional unit of public inputs, a 
further increase in the public-input expenditure implies an increase (de-
crease) in the ratio for financing the provision of public inputs. Given the 
income tax rate, this would call for a raise in the effective income tax rate -
7. 
Consider the goods-market equilibrium condition, which requires that 
the demand for good X2 equals to the domestic availability of X2： 
Eplip,u)=X2 + M (36) 
where Ep = dE{p, u)/dp = C2 by Shephard's lemma. 
Totally differentiate the above market equilibrium condition, we have 
dM 二 Epudu -崇dR (37) 
dR 
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where Ej^ 二 dEpjdU = dC2/dU > 0. From (5) and (10)-(14), X2 can be 
written as X 2 � R ) under the tariff regime. 
As the expenditure function E{p, u) is homogeneity of degree one in 
goods prices, we can define m = pEpJEu to express the marginal propensity 
to consume X2. Note that m lies between (0,1) by assuming that both goods 
are normal. Combining (33) to (35) with (37), we obtain 
dM —1 (dX2 , m � 
(——H——[ve -W2-r (1 - r) 
dR p-mt^dR p^ � ‘ 
+ (38) 
尝 = 袋 + +仏)盒)} (39) 
dM -1 rdX2 , m,. ” “ ，r�心 
= {-— H——[(ve -W2-r ) -wi[L2-\- L^) — 
dR p-mt^dR p^^ ‘ dR 
袋 + 爱)}} (4。） 
Consider the first term on the right hand side of (38) - (40). By defin-
ition, m is restricted to (0, 1). As p > p*, should be positive. The second 
term consists of two parts, which are characterized by the direct and indirect 
effect caused from a change in the public input level. The first part denotes 
the spillover effect of the public input, which increases the production of good 
2 and thus decreases the demand for imports directly. In cases of foreign 
capital tax and income tax, the second part is the import demand response 
to R through m/p . Equation (39) looks like equation (38) except the term 
r*, instead of r*( l - r) . Since income tax is a direct tax by its nature, it 
36 
meets our expectation that no distortions should be generated to our present 
model according to the trade literature (for example, see Michael and Hatzi-
panayotou, 2001). On the other hand, however, we notice that from equation 
(40), one more component exists in the equation i.e. e{dXi/dR-[-pdX2/dR). 
Intuitively, it is the demand side distortion generated by the imposition of 
the broad based consumption tax. Any changes in the public input level 
alter the production of both goods. To be specific, it exerts a negative force 
on the agricultural sector and a positive effect on the manufactured good. 
The consumption tax revenue collected by the government decreases by the 
amount of \edXi/dR\ and increases by \epdX2/dR\ at the same time. Note 
that dXi/dR is negative by (19). The direct income effect is indeterminable. 
This can be seen by differentiating the general domestic income function 
/ = ( 1 - kp){Xi -[-PX2 + W2L3) + (1 - k){Tr*R + e{Xi +PX2) + tM) with re-
spect to R: dl/dR = [ve-W2-r*{l-T)]-wi{L2 + L3)dX/dR + e(dXi/dR+ 
pdX2/dR) + tdM/dR. The overall effect, however, can be identified by look-
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ing at the simplified version of (38)，(39) and (40): 
dM —1 r � ， ( , � 
——= -uf — - em) + m(w2 + r*(l - r) 
dR p-mV R 
+ (41) 
婴 二 … e m ) + m—2 + + — + 為（42) 
dR p - mt dH 
R 
dM - 1 r � I r , * I fr � T �似 
dR p - mt R ari 
—(尝 + 譬)]} (43) 
where m is restricted to (0’ 1) and dX/dR > 0 by (19) and (20). From 
equation (2), we 
have X2/R > e and thus X2/R > em, then dM/dR < 0 
if either foreign capital tax or income tax is incorporating tariffs. In words, 
not surprisingly, the increase in public inputs in the urban area stimulates 
the domestic production of the manufactured good in the sense of lowered 
cost (or benefits from the public inputs). This always lowers the domestic 
demand for imports on the manufactured good. When consumption tax 
is imposed instead, only if \dXildR\ > \pdX2ldR\ gives the result that 
dM/dR < 0 and the sign remains indeterminable, otherwise. 
Proposition 1 In a tariff restricted, dual economy with foreign capital tax 
or income tax, an increase in public inputs in the urban areas always results 
in a higher urban unemployment ratio. It also applies for the case of con-
sumption tax when the supply response of good 1 to public inputs is greater 
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than that of good 2 in absolute term. 
We now turn to the welfare analysis. Recall equation (33), (34) and (35), 
we can identify the welfare impacts of the public input as follows: 
E u 备 = [ ^ e - W 2 - r*(l - T)]dR + t ^ - + (44) 
E 每 = + + (45) 
n du , *�I dM “ , r�办 
Consider a special case of our model, where the economy is at its full em-
ployment level, i.e. dX/dR = 0. Then the above equations are reduced 
to 
E 每 = [ v e - W 2 - r % l - r ) ] + t ^ (47) 
E 為 = � — - r �女 t 盖 m 
du *�，dM I .dXi pdX2^ ,川、 
Eu 丽 = + + + (49) 
The first order welfare effect of urban development and the second order 
welfare effect through the indirect income effect of public inputs are shown 
in equations (47) to (49). Notice that ve is the marginal gain from producing 
each additional unit of R in all cases, and W2 + r * ( l - r ) - tdM/dR or W2 + 
r* - tdM/dR is the corresponding marginal cost of producing such marginal 
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unit of R in cases of foreign capital tax or income tax, respectively. The 
foreign capital tax or income tax revenue redistributed to consumers must 
be reduced by W2 + r * { l - T ) or 1^2+7^*’ depending on whether foreign capital 
tax or income tax is being exercised. The second order effect is captured 
by the term tdM/dR. Through the progress of urban development, imports 
are reduced given that X2/R > e as well as the tariff income. Subsequently, 
it lowers the economy's income and has a negative impact on the welfare 
level. Obviously, welfare increases through the urban development if ve > 
+ r*(l — T) — tdM/dR in case of foreign capital is imposed or if ve > 
切2 + r* — tdM/dR when income tax is imposed. If the government chooses 
consumption tax as a mean to finance the public input expenditure, on top of 
the above two forces, a third order welfare effect should be considered. This 
third order effect is captured by e(dXildR+pdX2ldR). When consumption 
tax is levied on all commodities, any changes in the level of public inputs 
will exert a negative impact on the agricultural sector and a positive effect 
on the manufactured good. The consumption tax revenue collected by the 
government increases (decreases) if the absolute value of dXi/dR < (>) 
pdX2/dR. 
From the above analysis, we show that when the financing constraint of 
public inputs is considered, an increase in the level of public input is not 
necessarily increases the welfare level of the economy. Obviously, at the 
beginning of urban development where public-input injection is very small, 
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the newly developed region always benefits from such urban development as 
when —> 0 and v oo. When the public inputs are increased to a certain 
level, a further increase in the production of public input would actually 
reduce the welfare level. It can be comprehended rather intuitively. More 
public inputs call for more financing needs. In other words, the government 
is competing for the limited resources within the economy. If more and 
more resources and, put it to an extreme, that all resources are allocated in 
producing such public inputs, the gross national product would be reduced 
to zero and surely it is not an optimal case for any economy. The implication 
is that, the public input can be "excessive" and become socially sub-optimal, 
regardless of whether unemployment exists or not in the economy. 
In more general, we have one more welfare effect via the induced shift 
in urban employment denoted by the third term on the right hand side of 
equation (44)，（45) and (46). Given that dX/dR > 0’ this effect always 
offsets the direct welfare gain or aggravates the welfare loss. 
To obtain the optimal level of public inputs, we simply set Eudu/dR = 0. 
As a result, we get 
� dM ” T , � � 
ve = W2 + r (1 - r) - t— + wi[L2 + ^ s ) ^ I叫） 
* dM , , t � d A / r i N 
ve = W2 + r* - t— + wi{L2 + l^lj 
^ dM ,dXi pdX2� , � r � 办 /CO� 
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which implicitly define the optimal levels of public inputs. 
The above statements show that the level of public inputs is optimal 
when the marginal gain of public inputs is completely offset by the marginal 
cost. The optimal level of public inputs is determined by the following 
equations if full employment prevails in the economy: 
ve = W2 + r * { l - T ) - t ^ (53) 
dJti 
农 dM 
ve = W2-\-r* - t—— (54) 
cLK 
^ dM ,dXi pdX2� , e � � 
On the other hand, it is identified by (50)，(51) and (52) if unemploy-
ment exists. Applying the concavity of the spillover function g{R), the 
optimal level of public input is smaller as dX/dR > 0. 
Proposition 2 In a dual economy where unemployment exists, the optimal 
level of public inputs, which are financed by tariff and either foreign capital 
tax, income tax or consumption tax revenue, is always smaller than that 
under full-employment, as there is a negative employment effect. 
Compare the above three cases, assuming all those elasticities are eval-
uated at the same initial level, the optimal level of public inputs implied in 
case of income tax should be lower than that of foreign capital tax and even 
lower in case of consumption tax, given that \dXildR\ > \pdX2ldR\ and 
the concavity of the g{R) function. 
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5 Public Inputs, Financing Constraints and Na-
tional Welfare: The Quota Case 
We are now ready to set up the stage for the quota regime. The financing 
constraint for any level of public inputs can be expressed as follow 
{W2 + r*)R = k{{p-p*)Q + Tr*K* + p[Xi + pX2 + {{w2 + r*)R-
+ e { X i + p X 2 ) } (56) 
The formation of the above constraint is much similar to that in the 
previous section. Under quota regime, the domestic producer price, p, is 
flexible. Note that, under a consumption tajc, the consumer price is p = 
p ( l + e). Here, (p — p*) is the difference between the domestic producer 
price and the world price for the manufactured good induced by the quota 
restriction where p > p* in normal sense, and Q denotes the level of quota 
set by the government. Once again, in the forthcoming analysis, only one of 
the three taxes (foreign capital tax, income tax and consumption tax) and 
quota is included at one time for the purpose of comparison later. According 
to our assumption that the relationship between the public input production 
and the primary factor is one to one, we can rewrite the above constraint 
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and get the following equation 
{w2^r*)R = k[{p - + Tr*R + p{Xi + pX2 + W2L3) 
+ e { X i + p X 2 ) ] (57) 
The economy's budget constraint can be summarized as 
E(j/,u) = (1 - p)(Xi -i-pX2 + W2L3) + (1 - k)[(p - p*)Q + Tr*R 
+ pX2 + W2L3) + e(Xi + PX2)] (58) 
二 （ 1 一 7 ) (X i + pX2 + 
+(1 - k)[(p - p*)Q + T,R + e{Xi +PX2)] (59) 
Recall that 7 = kp, the first term on the right hand side of (59) denotes 
the income proceeds to the domestic production units after deduction of the 
effective income tax, and the second term is tax revenue from quota and, 
either foreign capital tax or consumption tax, redistributed to the public 
after paying for the production of public inputs, {p - p*)Q indicates the 
amount of quota rent that can be captured by the local government, Tr*R 
is the foreign capital tax revenue that can be collected by the government 
and e {Xi + pX2) is simply the consumption tax revenue from commodities 
purchased by local consumers. 
Differentiate the financing constraint of (57) by imposing different kinds 
44 
of tax separately with quota we get 
{w2^r*)dR = (p - p*)Qdk + rr^Rdk + kQdp + kTr*dR (60) 
(W2 + r*)dR = {p - p*)Qdk + p{Xi + pX2 + W2L3)dk + kQdp 
+kp{dXi + pdX2 + X2dp + w 讽 3) (61) 
{w2+r*)dR = {p-p*)Qdk + e{Xi ^pX2)dk + kQdp 
+ke{dXi-\-pdX2 + X2dp) (62) 
Equations (60)，(61) and (62) denote the total differentiations when for-
eign capital tax, income tax or consumption tax is taken place with quota, 
respectively. For the purpose of welfare analysis in the later part, we try 
to solve the impact of public inputs to the relative price ratio here (Recall-
ing that i? has a partial effect on p by equation (17)). Differentiating the 
economy's budget constraint in (59) by assuming different combinations as 
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usual, the following set of equations is resulted 
Ep>dp + Eudu = dXi + pdX2 + 义2办 + W2dL3 + (1 - /c) [rr^dR + Qdp] 
-lTr*R+(p-p*)Q]dk (63) 
Ep>dp + Eudu = (1 - kp)(dXi + pdX2 + X2dp + W2dL3) 
-p{Xi + pX2 + W2Ls)dk + (1 - k)Qdp 
-(p-p*)Qdk (64) 
Ep'dp + Eudu = dXi + pdX2 + X2dp + W2dL3 - [{p - p*)Q 
-e{Xi +pX2)]dk + (1 - k)[Qdp 
+ e ( d X i ^ p d X 2 + X2dp)] (65) 
Consider the goods-market equilibrium condition, which requires that 
the demand for good X2 equals the domestic availability of X2： 
Ep'(p',u) = X2 + Q (66) 
where and Ep' 二 dE{p', u)/dp' = Ch by Shephard's lemma. From the system 
of equations stated in Appendix A.l , X i can be expressed as a function of 
p and R. i.e. X2 = X2(p, R). Thus we can total differentiate this market 
condition and obtain the following expression. 
Ep�du-(c + s){Q/p)dp = {dX2/dR)dR (67) 
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where c = -{p/Q){dEp>/dp) > 0 and s = {p/Q){dX2/dp) > 0. Note that 
c can be interpreted as the consumption substitution for a given utility in 
response to a change in p, and s represents the substitution in production of 
the manufactured good X2 in response to a change in p. Recalling equation 
(32) and utilizing the market condition in (66), equation (63), (64) and (65) 
can be simplified as follow 
Eudu = [ve -W2-r*{l- T)]dR - wi{L2 + L3)dX (68) 
Eudu = (ve -W2- r*)dR - wi (L2 + L3)dX (69) 
Eudu = (ve — W2 一 — wi(L2 + 
+e{dXi + pdX2 + X2dp) (70) 
A consistent result can be observed in equation (60), (61) and (62). 
Calculating the partial derivatives dk/dp and dk/dR, we notice that in all 
three cases, dk/dp < 0 and dk/dR > 0，thus we can state the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3 In a dual economy with public inputs where good 1 is ex-
portable and good 2 is importable, if quota is imposed on the importable, 
then an increase in the relative price ratio of good 2 would always reduce the 
ratio k for the provision of public inputs, whereas an increase in the public 
input expenditure would always raise such the ratio. 
Define rh = p E ^ ' j E u which expresses the marginal propensity to con-
47 
sume X2�holding the assumption that both goods are normal. Combining 
equation (68) to (70) with equation (67), the effect of public inputs on the 
relative price ratio of manufacturing sector can be solved as 
^ = + f^lve - W 2 - r*(l - r) - w,{L2 + 
/ A (71) 
实 二 { - P ( 绘 ) + wi{L2 + L3 ) (|^ ) ] } / A (72) 
dR on ^^ 
^ 二 { - p ( 瓷 ) + 河 — - 奶 + 
+《综+眷wr (73) 
where A 二 Q(c + s) + 而 1/；1(丄2+ I/3)(拟/办）and V = Q[c +s)+ m[wi{L2 + 
L3){dX/dp) - 6X21. From (18), dX/dp > 0’ implying that A > 0. The sign 
of r is indeterminable. The numerators of the above equations consist of 
two parts. The first part is the price effect of the supply response to public 
inputs. An increase in public input level raises the domestic supply of man-
ufactured good and hence exerts a negative pressure on the relative price 
ratio of good X2. The second part indicates the price effect of the demand 
response to public inputs through the marginal propensity to consume good 
X2. Equation (72) looks like equation (73) except the term r*’ instead of 
r*( l - r) . Consistent with cases of tariff, since income tax is a direct tax by 
its nature, no distortion is generated to our present model. Equation (73), 
however, captures a distortion induced by the imposition of consumption tax 
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by the term e{dXi/dR-\- pdX2/dR). Any changes in the public input level 
alter the production level of both goods. A negative force is exerted on the 
agricultural sector and a positive effect on the manufactured good. The con-
sumption tax revenue collected by the government, consequently, decreases 
by the amount of \edXi/dR\ (Recalling that dXi/dR is negative by (19)) 
and increases by \epdX2/dR\. The direct income effect is indeterminable. 
This can be seen by differentiating the general domestic income function 
I = {l-kp){Xi+ pX2 + 奶丄3) + (1 - k)[{p -p*)Q + Tr*R + e(Xi + 
with respect to R: dl/dR = [^ ue - W2 - r*{l - r)] - wi(L2 + L^)d\ldR + 
e {dXi ldR + pdX2/dR). The overall effect, however, can be identified by 
looking at the simplified version of (71), (72) and (73): 
% = - em) + m[w2 + r*(l - r) + wi(L2 + 
dR R 
/ A (74) 
% = - em) + m[w2 + r* + + A (75) 
dR R 
盖 = - em) + mlw2 + r* + wiiL2 + -
+響)l}/r (76) 
Given m < l,dX/dR > 0 and X2/R > e, we have X2/R > em and 
dp/dR < 0 if either foreign capital tax or income tax is incorporating with 
tariffs. In words, an increase in public inputs in the urban area always 
lowers the relative price of manufactured good. When consumption tax is 
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used instead, dp/dR < 0 if and only if \dXi/dR\ > \pdX2/dR\ and r > O.12 
Under the quota regime, the change in public input incurs a direct and an 
indirect effect. The direct effect is evaluated at constant goods price ratio, 
while the indirect effects is induced by the change price ratio. To capture this 
indirect effect, we have to reconsider d入/dR here. Recall equation (17), with 
dX/dR > 0 from (19), dX/dp > 0 from (18) and, given that IdXi/dRj > 
lpdX2/dRl and F > 0, dp/dR < 0’ from equation (17)，（74) to (76), we 
can see that dA/dR < (>)0 if -p/R > (<)e. Based on these results, the 
following proposition can be written 
Proposition 4 In a quota restricted, dual economy with foreign capital tax 
or income tax, an increase in public inputs in the urban areas results a 
lower (higher) urban unemployment ratio, if the price elasticity of public 
inputs dominates (is outweighed by) the output elasticity. It also applies for 
the case of consumption tax when the supply response of good 1 to public 
inputs is greater than that of good 2 in absolute term. 
We can interpret the above proposition like this. Through the process of 
urban development, if the government produces the public inputs to a level 
that substantially lowers the relative price of good 2，the return to capital in 
manufacturing sector falls. Consequently, capital moves out from the urban 
to rural areas, hence raising the rural wage rate. This discourages migra-
tion from the rural to the urban areas, and thus the urban unemployment 
The sign of F is indeterminable if either one of the two conditions cannot be satisfied. 
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ratio declines. This relationship can be also seen from the labor market 
equilibrium in (5) that a rise in wi necessarily implies a drop in A. 
We now turn to the welfare analysis. Recalling equations (68)，(69) and 
(70)，we can identify the welfare change by the change in the public inputs 
as follow: 
Eu 盖=be-奶一 r*(l —T)]—+ 盒 （77) 
E為=(ve-W2-n-w,(L2 + Ls)^ (78) 
cLK arC 
du , *� , ^  ^ s dX ,dX\ pdX2 
+ 略 （79) 
Consider a special case of our model, where the economy is at its full 
employment state, i.e. dX/dR = 0. Then the above equations are reduced 
to 
E為=ve-[w2 + T*{l-T)] (80) 
dJti 
Eu^ 二 (ve -W2- r*) (81) 
cLK 
r. du .dXi pdX2�Y dp� fon\ 
The first order welfare effect of urban development are shown in equa-
tions (80) to (82). Note that ve is the marginal gain from producing each 
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additional R in all three cases, while W2 + r*(l - r ) and W2 + r* are the 
corresponding marginal cost if foreign capital tax or income tax is imposed 
respectively as the foreign capital tax or income tax revenue redistribute 
to the public must be reduced by these two amount accordingly. Obvi-
ously, the welfare level will increases through the urban development if 
ve > iL;2+r*(l—r) in foreign capital tax case and if ve > W2+r* when income 
tax is imposed. In case the government chooses consumption tax as a mean 
to finance the public input expenditure, two more welfare effect should be 
considered. This second order effect is captured by e{dXildR +^6X2/dR). 
As consumption tax is levied on all commodities, any changes in public input 
level will exert a negative impact on the agricultural sector and a positive 
effect on the manufactured good. The consumption tax revenue collected by 
the government increases (decreases) if the absolute value of dXi/dR < (>) 
pdX2/dR. The third welfare effect is denoted by XidpjdR, which is the 
price effect induced from the change in public input level. Holding the 
original production level of good 2 unchanged, it measures the decrease in 
consumption tax revenue resulted from an increase in the public input level. 
Once again, we show that when the financing constraint of the public 
inputs is considered, increasing the level of public inputs is not necessarily 
increases the welfare level of the economy. Urban development at the earliest 
stage is always beneficial and when the public inputs accumulate to a certain 
level, further increases in the production of public inputs would actually 
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reduce welfare. The intuition of the story can be easily understood as in 
tariff case. To summarize public inputs can be "excessive" and become 
socially suboptimal, regardless of whether unemployment exists or not in 
the economy. 
In more general, we have one more welfare effect via the induced shift 
in urban employment denoted by the second term in the right hand side of 
equations (77), (78) and (79). Since dXjdR can be greater or smaller than 
zero, if the price elasticity of public inputs dominates (is outweighed by) the 
output elasticity, this effect will either reinforce (offset) the direct welfare 
gain or mitigate (aggravate) the welfare loss. 
To obtain the optimal level of public inputs, we simply set Eudu/dR = 0. 
As a result, we get 
dA 
ve 二 + - T) +1^1(1^2 + 丽 (83) 
ve = W2 + r* + wi{L2 + (84) 
* , , , d\ ,dXi pdX2 ^ dp. , � e � 
饥 = 奶 + r + 也 1 ( 丄 2 + 丄 3 ) 而 — + 丽）（85) 
The above statements show that the level of public inputs is optimal 
when the marginal gain of public inputs is completely offset by the marginal 
cost. The optimal level of public inputs is determined by the following 
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equations if full employment is prevailing in the economy: 
ve 二 + — T) (86) 
ve = W2 + r* (87) 
- = 盖 + + 而盖） _ 
On the other hand, it is identified by (83), (84) and (85) if unemploy-
ment exists. Applying the concavity of the spillover function g(R), the 
optimal level of public inputs is smaller (greater) if dXIdR < (>)0. 
Proposition 6 In a dual economy where unemployment exists, the optimal 
level of the public inputs, which are financed by quota rents and by foreign 
capital tax, income tax or consumption tax revenue, is smaller (greater) than 
that under full-employment, as there exists a negative (positive) employment 
effect. 
Compare the above three cases, assuming all those elasticities are eval-
uated at the same initial level, the optimal level of public inputs implied in 
case of income tax should be lower than that of foreign capital tax and even 
lower in case of consumption tax, given that \dXi/dR\ > \pdX2/dR\ and 
the concavity of g{R) function. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis examined the relationship between public inputs, unemployment 
and welfare in a small, open dual economy under two trade regimes: tariff 
and quota. The financing constraint is explicitly stated in the model, and 
the unemployment is captured by the Harris-Todaro setup. The following 
results are obtained. 
In tariff case: 
(i) There is always a positive relationship between the level of public 
inputs and the unemployment rate. 
(ii) The optimal public inputs implied when unemployment exists is al-
ways smaller than that when full employment prevails. 
In quota case: 
. ( i ) There is a positive (negative) relationship between the level of public 
inputs and the unemployment rate, if and only if the price elasticity of public 
inputs is outweighed by (dominates) the output elasticity. 
(ii) The optimal public inputs implied when employment exists is smaller 
than that when full employment prevails if dX/dR > 0, and vice versa. 
In both cases, we showed that when the financing constraint of public 
inputs is considered, an increase in the level of public inputs is not necessarily 
raises the welfare level of the economy. The public inputs can be "excessive" 
and become socially sub-optimal, regardless of whether unemployment exists 
or not in the economy. 
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Last but not the least, we found that when different taxes are put to-
gether with either tariff or quota for the purpose of public inputs financing, 
different levels of the optimal public inputs would be obtained. Put it simply, 
assuming that all elasticities are evaluated at the same point, the optimal 
level of public inputs implied in case of income tajc should be lower than 
that of foreign capital tax, and even lower in case of consumption tax, given 
the concavity of g{R) function. Moreover, this result applies on both the 
tariff and quota case. 
Several interesting extensions of this model can be remarked here for fu-
ture studies. Firstly, as the welfare effect induced from the increase in public 
inputs usually lasts for a long period of time, it is appropriate to capture 
this "inter-temporal" sense within a dynamic version of this model. In this 
direction, Palivos and Yip (1995) is a good reference for our further study. 
They establish a dynamic model to examine the issue of the government 
expenditure financing in an endogenous growth model, which relates to our 
topic quite well. Secondly, there can be more interpretations on k, which 
is the proportion of tax revenue contributes to the public input production. 
It is noteworthy to concern such ratio as how much ta.x revenue residuals 
redistributed to the public would be surely affects the economy's welfare 
level. Finally, though we discussed tariff and quota with unemployment and 
public inputs in this paper, other trade restrictions such as VERs can also 
be analyzed based on this framework. 
56 , i 
7 Appendix A 
A . l Comparative statics (18) and (19) 
Define Oii 二 WiCiJCi and Oki = r C H C as the distributive shares of 
labor and capital in sector i, and Xu = Cl^Xi/L and Xjci = C^-Xi/K as the 
fractions of labor and capital employed in sector i, respectively. Differenti-
ating (5)，(10) through (13)，the following 5x5 matrix is obtained 
A'B = CR + Dp 
where 
丨 0 ^ ^ 一1 0 0 、 
hi 0 0 0 
eK2 0 0 0 0 
SLl + (1 + -SLl A(AL2 + ALS) (1 + A)AL2 
� - { S K I + SK2) SKI 0 \kI \K2 / 
_ / ^ ^ ^ Y 





C = e 
- ( 1 + A)AL3 I 0 
f 
乃二 0 0 1 0 0 
V / 
Using the "Hat Calculus" ’ the following comparative statics can be solved. 
r/p 二 > 0 
w^/p = -0kiI^K2HI < 0 
A/p 二 [(l + A ) A | ( ^ ^ / ^ � 0 
+ A) + 9KI>^K2[SLI + (1 + A)(Al2 + Al3)]}/I^ < 0 
X2IP = {OL\>^KI[SLI + SL2(1 + A)1 + eLl\Ll{sKl + SK2) + OKISKI><LI 
+eKl\Kl[sLl + (1 + A)(AL2 + A l s ) ] } / ^ > 0 
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r / R = ejBKi > 0 
w i l R = -eeKilOK^Oii < 0 
X/R = -[(l + \)l\]{wilR)>{) 
Xi/R = e(Xi/p) - [Ak2Al3^li^K2(1 + A)]/D < 0 
X2/R = eiX2/p) + [AKiAL3^Life(l + X)]/D > 0 
where Sii = (^i^Li^Ki, SKi = (^i^Ki^Li, D = dLl^K2[^Ll^K2 - (1 + 
A)A/ciAl2] and ai = which denotes the factor substitution in 
sector i. 
A.2 dk/dp and dk/dR in equation (60), (61) and (62) 
Take the partial derivatives of k with respect to p and R, the fol-
lowing results are obtained: 
丝 _ - k Q Q . d k = + (1 - k r y � 0 
石 = { p ' - p * ) Q ^ T r * R ‘ ( j / + 
dk _ -k{Q + pX2) 色 _ W2^r* 
石 二 < u ’ 丽 — . 
丝 二 -k{Q + eX2) dk _W2+r* ^ ^ 
'Wp 二 Jl ' 丽 - J l 
where = — p*)Q + p(Xi + p'X2 + W2L3) > 0 and aa = (p' 一 P*)Q + 
e(Xi + p'X2�> 0. The first equation is the case when foreign capital tax is 
used, the second one is the situation when income tax is employed and the 
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last equation is derived from the case when consumption tax is imposed. 
A.3 Stability condition 
If quota is employed to serve as a mean to protect the domestic 
industry, we have to impose the stability condition to determine the signs of 
derivatives solved from the system in appendix 1. According to Dei (1985), 
the adjustment process for the goods market is 
P 二 aZip) 
where the dot is the time derivative, a is a positive constant and Z — 
Ep{p, u) - {X2 + Q) is the excess demand for the importable good. From 
(59), we can obtain that u is a function of p. By keeping Q constant, we 
can take a linear approximation of the above adjustment process around the 
equilibrium point p® as 
p = a{dZ/dp){p-p^) 
Hence the necessary and sufficient condition for stability of the system 
is dZjd'p < 0. If foreign capital tax or income tax is imposed, from (67), 
(68)and (69)，we can obtain dpjdZ = - p / A , where A 二 Q[c+s)+mwi{L2+ 
Lz){d\ldv). Since c > 0 and dX/dp > 0, a sufficient condition for A > 0 
is s 二 { j>IQ) {pX2ld j )�> 0’ which requires D > 0 in the above comparative 
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statics. That is, the normal price-output response assures stability of the 
system. 
When consumption tax is imposed as a financing source for public input 
provision, the situation becomes more complicate. From (67) and (70), we 
h a v e d v l d Z 二 一 p / [ A _ e ( c O : i / 办 + P 丄 Y 2 / 办 + B y using ry,, t o d e n o t e 
the cross elasticity of good i with respect to the price of good j , we have 
dp/dZ 二 - 6X2(1 + m2Xi/p + 仍2)1. Since A > 0 as s > 0, the 
sufficient condition for dp/dZ < 0 is that (Vi2^i/p + V22) < —1. Thus, the 
two goods produced in the economy can be either substitutes or complements 
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